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LESBIANS, GAY MEN,
AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER
OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS©
BY BRENDA COSSMAN"
The legacy of the first twenty years of the Charter
for lesbians and gay men is a contradictory one of
victories and defeats. At the level of doctrine, strategy,
and politics, both the victories and defeats have been
precarious and contradictory. While gaining formal
equality rights, lesbians and gay men have not been able
to secure rights to sexual freedom. And while formal
equality has displaced the heteronormativity that denied
legal recognition and subjectivity to lesbians and gay
men, this formal equality has come at a cost. Lesbians
and gay men are being reconstituted in law: some are
being newly constituted as legal citizens while others are
being re-inscribed as outlaws. The first twenty years of
the Charter is a legacy of transgression and
normalization; these new legal subjects are both
challenging dominant modes of legal subjectivity and its
insistence of heterosexuality, while being absorbed into
them.
Dans les vingt premiires ann6es suivant son entr6e
en vigueur, la Charte a laiss6 un patrimoine marqu6 de
victoires et d'6checs pour les lesbiennes et les homme
homosexuels. Les victoires et les 6checs ont 6t6 pr~caires
et contradictoires au niveau de la doctrine, de la strat6gie
et de la politique. Malgr6 la reconnaissance formelle
1'6galit6, les lesbiennes et les hommes homosexuels n'ont
pas pu obtiendre le droit A ]a libert6 sexuelle. Tandis que
I'Ngalit formelle a d~plac6 la h~tdronormativit6 qui
privait les hommes homosexuels et les lesbiennes d'une
reconnaissance juridique et d'une subjectivit6,
lobtention de cette dgalitd formelle n'a pas 6t6 sans
cofit. Les lesbiennes et les hommes homosexuels sont
reconstitu~s en droit: certains sont nouvellement
d~sign6s comme 6tant des citoyensjuridiques tandis que
d'autres sont red6finis comme 6tant des hors-la-loi.
Vingt ans apr~s son entr6e en vigueur, la Charte a laiss6
un patrimoine de transgression et de normalisation; ces
nouveaux sujets juridiques contestent les principaux
modes de la subjectivit6 juridique ainsi que 'accent mis
sur la h&t6rosexualit6, tout en &ant absorb6s par ceux-ci.
I. INTRODU CTION ................................................ 224
II. THE EARLY CASES: MOSSOP AND EGAN ......................... 225
III. THE TURNING POINT: VRIEND .................................. 231
IV. THE HIGH WATER MARK:
SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIP EQUALITY .......................... 233
V. WHAT ABOUT SEX AND EXPRESSION?
LI7TLE SISTERS BOOKSTORE ................................... 239
VI. CONFLICTING RIGHTS: RELIGION VERSUS SEXUALITY ......... 243
VII. VICTORIES, DEFEATS, AND NEW LEGAL SUBJECTS ............. 246
©2002, B. Cossman.
Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. With thanks to Bruce Ryder for his comments
and Joe-Anne Pickel for her excellent research assistance.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL.40, NOS. 3 & 4
I. INTRODUCTION
Many stories have been told about the legacy of the first twenty
years of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' for lesbians and gay
men. Some progressive voices tell a celebratory story, in which the Charter
has been an important tool in challenging the denial of formal legal
equality. Laws that discriminate against individual lesbians and gay men, as
well as laws that discriminate against same-sex relationships, have been
struck down by the courts, forcing begrudging legislatures to amend their
laws to respect formal equality rights.2 Other, often more conservative
voices, tell a story about the powerful and dangerous potential of rights
discourse and the Charter, which are eroding the rightful place of
legislatures in a liberal democracy. According to these Charter critics,
lesbians and gay men, like other equality-seeking or, in their language,
"special interest" groups, have successfully used the Charter to hijack the
democratic process.3
In attempting to evaluate the significance of the first twenty years
of the Charter for lesbian and gay rights, I believe that there is some truth
to both of these stories. The Charter has been an effective tool in
challenging the denial of formal legal equality of lesbians and gay men.
Laws that discriminate against lesbian and gay individuals and relationships
have been struck down as unconstitutional, and legislatures have been
forced to amend their laws to extend formal legal equality. In so doing,
there has been a shift in the politics of democracy. The Charter
critics-right and left-are correct to point out that courts have done what
almost no legislature was prepared to do. The legalization of politics has
delivered formal equality for lesbians and gay men.
But the legacy of the first twenty years of the Charter for lesbians
and gay men is more complicated than either of these defenders or critics
would suggest. My assessment is located within the more critical scholarship
that emphasizes both the possibilities and limitations of Charter litigation
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. I I
[Charter].
2 See e.g. Donald G. Casswell, "Moving Toward Same-Sex Marriage" (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 810;
Donald G. Casswell, "Any Two Persons in Canada's Lotusland, British Columbia" in Robert Wintemute
& Mads Andenaes, eds., Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study in National, European and
International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2001) 215; Kathleen A. Lahey, Are We "Persons" Yet?: Law and
Sexuality in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999).
3 See Ranier Knopf & F.L. Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough: Nelson, 1992); Ranier Knopf
& F.L. Morton, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000).
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and the law more generally.4 The legacy of lesbian and gay legal struggles
under the Charter is a contradictory one-both the victories and defeats
have been "fragile, partial and contradictory."5 In this article, I attempt to
tease out and evaluate this contradictory nature of these legal victories and
defeats on multiple levels by analyzing the doctrinal developments, the
nature of the legal strategies, as well as the broader political implications
of the decisions. This includes the mobilization of legal and political
movements, both for and against gay and lesbian rights, the nature of the
legal and political identities constituted by these movements, and both the
assimilative and subversive potential of these identities. I am particularly
interested in the new legal subjects that are being constituted on the legal
stage. While the heteronormativity of law and the legal subject has been
increasingly challenged, lesbians and gay men have been partially absorbed
into dominant modalities of legal subjectivity. The complex processes of
inclusion and exclusion have led to the emergence of new legal subjects who
are both normalized and transgressive.6
II. THE EARLY CASES: MOSSOP AND EGAN
One of the first Charter challenges, brought by Karen Andrews
under the banner "We Are Family," challenged the exclusion of same-sex
couples and their children from the Ontario Health Insurance Program.7
Doctrinally, she lost. The court held that there was no violation of section
15: while opposite sex couples could marry, procreate, and raise children,
same-sex couples could not. Same-sex couples were biologically different,
and hence, not entitled to formal equality with heterosexual couples. The
heteronormativity of Andrews was echoed in decision after decision. In the
4 See e.g. Didi Herman, Rights of Passage: Struggles for Lesbian and Gay Legal Equality (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1994) [Herman, Rights of Passagel; Carl F. Stychin, Law's Desire: Sexuality
and the Limits of Justice (London: Routledge, 1995); Carl F. Stychin, "Essential Rights and Contested
Identities: Sexual Orientation and Equality Rights Jurisprudence in Canada" (1995) 8 Can. J.L. & Jur.
49; Susan B. Boyd, "Family, Law and Sexuality: Feminist Engagements" (1999) 8 Social and Legal
Studies 369 [Boyd, "Family, Law and Sexuality"].
5 Shelley A.M. Gavigan "Morgentaler and Beyond: Abortion, Reproduction and the Courts" in
Janine Brodie, Shelley A.M. Gavigan & Jane Jenson, The Politics of Abortion (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1992) at 126.
6 See generally Jeffrey Weeks, "The Sexual Citizen" in Mike Featherstone, ed., Love and Eroticism
(London: Sage, 1999) 35; Carl F. Stychin, "Sexual Citizenship in the European Union" (2001) 5
Citizenship Studies 285-320; Carl F. Stychin, A Nation by Rights: National Cultures, Sexual Identity
Politics, and the Discourse of Rights (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998).
7 Andrews v. Ontario (Minister of Health) (1988), 49 D.L.R. (4th) 584 (Ont. H.C.J.) [Andrews].
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first marriage challenge under the Charter, for example, the majority of the
Ontario Court, General Division held that the exclusion of lesbian and gay
couples from marriage was justified by the "biological limitations of such
a union."8 The dissenting opinion, however, rejected the focus on biological
difference, and held that the state's interest in promoting marriage and
families should be related to function, not form.
The stage was set. Doctrinally, conservative judges focused on
biological differences to justify the exclusion of same-sex couples while
more progressive judges focused on the equality of same-sex relationships
and the recognition of diverse family forms. These two positions would
continue to divide judicial opinion. 9 The Layland marriage case also set the
strategic stage for lesbian and gay litigants. Rather than appealing the
marriage decision, the lesbian and gay activists involved decided to focus
their attention on challenging the common law definitions of spouse found
in provincial and federal legislation.1" These challenges to opposite sex
definitions of spouse had already begun to percolate their way up through
the courts, with the decisions reflecting this conservative/progressive divide.
The first gay equality rights case to reach the Supreme Court of
Canada involved a gay man, Brian Mossop, who challenged his employer's
refusal to grant him bereavement leave to attend the funeral of his partner's
father, on the ground that they were not members of each other's
"immediate family."'" The case was not strictly speaking a Charter
challenge, although it had a number of doctrinal, strategic, and political
implications for subsequent Charter challenges. Mossop took his case to the
Canadian Human Rights Commission, arguing that the denial of the leave
constituted discrimination on the basis of family status (sexual orientation
was not at the time a prohibited ground within the Canadian Human Rights
8 Layland v. Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations) (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th)
214 at 222-23 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [Layland].
9 For cases following the conservative approach, see e.g. Vogel v. Manitoba (1992), 90 D.L.R. (4th)
84 (Man. Q.B.), rev'd (1995) 126 D.L.R. (4th) 72 (Man. C.A.); Canada (A.G.) v. Mossop (1990), 71
D.L.R. (4th) 661 (F.C.A.); and, most recently, EGALE Canada Inc. v. Canada (A. G.), [2001] B.C.J. No.
1995 (S.C.) (QL). For cases following the progressive approach, see e.g. Veysey v. Canada (Commissioner
of the Correctional Service), [1990] 1 F.C. 321 (T.D.); Knodel v. British Columbia (Medical Services
Commission) (1991), 58 B.C.L.R. (2d) 356 (S.C.); Vogelv. Manitoba (1995), 126 D.L.R. (4th) 72 (Man.
C.A.). For divided cases, see Egan v. Canada (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 336 (F.C.A.), aff'd [1995] 2 S.C.R.
513 [Egan], and M. v. H. (1996), 142 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.), aff'd [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 [M. v. H.].
10 "The Impact of the Supreme Court Decision in Egan v. Canada Upon Claims for the Equal
Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships," online: EGALE Canada
<http://www.islandnet.com/-egale/lega/egan-an.htm>.
11Mossop v. Canada (A.G.), [19931 1 S.C.R. 554 at 555 [Mossop].
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Act 12). The majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the case on the ground
that the denial was based on sexual orientation, not family status, and that
absent a constitutional challenge to the Human Rights Act, there was no
basis for the claim.
Doctrinally, the ruling in Mossop represented a defeat. However,
the precedential value of Mossop for subsequent Charter litigation was
limited. The Court had requested additional submissions from the litigants
on the potential implications of Haig,3 in which the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that the exclusion of sexual orientation from the federal
Human Rights Code was a violation of section 15 of the Charter. The
Mossop litigants decided not to raise the constitutional question, insisting
instead that the Court decide the matter on the basis of family status. As a
result of not raising the constitutional arguments, the decision had little
precedential value for future Charter challenges.
While the majority dismissed the appeal, the dissenting opinion of
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 included a compelling and sophisticated
discussion of the meaning of family and argued for the need to recognize
the diversity of Canadian families. The dissent represented a significant
contribution to the emergence of judicial doctrine endorsing a more
functional approach to the family. The doctrinal legacy of Mossop was
contradictory, representing a very limited defeat, and a victory within that
defeat.
Strategically, the litigants' arguments in the case-and the
deliberations behind their decisions-were also contradictory, embodying
partial victories and partial defeats. First, the case represented an
interesting attempt by the litigants to frame the issue in the discourse of
equality, while consciously trying to mitigate the sameness argument. In a
conscious attempt to disrupt the heteronormativity of law, Mossop and the
intervenors supporting his claim tried to limit their reliance on sameness
arguments and the heterosexual equivalency of same-sex relationships. 4
Even in arguing for a functional equivalency approach, Mossop himself
refused to make arguments on the basis of sexual monogamy. Second, the
litigants made complex arguments about intersectional discrimination,
insisting that discrimination on the basis of family status included
discrimination against same-sex couples. Both of these arguments were only
12 R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 [Human Rights Act].
13 Haig v. Canada (1992), 9 O.R. (3d) 495 (C.A.).
14 See Jody Freeman, "Defining Family in Mossop v. DSS: The Challenge of Anti-essentialism and
Interactive Discrimination for Human Rights Litigation" (1994) 44 U.T.L.J. 41.
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partially successful. Functional approaches to the family are invariably
measured against a set of norms about what families do or ought to do.15
While these functional definitions can help disrupt biological and
conservative definitions, they are at the same time shaped by dominant
familial norms. The complex arguments about discrimination and identity
did not have legal resonance, at least not for the majority. However, the
arguments no doubt contributed to wider-ranging discussions about the
meaning of family, as well as to broader debates about the possibility and
limitations of presenting complex arguments about discrimination and
identity in legal fora. 6
In this sense, the broader political implications of Mossop were also
highly contradictory. Despite the doctrinal loss, Mossop himself considered
the case to be a victory because it had created space to talk about
homosexuality. t7 The relative success of the case was, in this view, to be
measured not against the legal outcome, but rather, in terms of its
contribution to public sphere deliberations. However, other commentators
have pointed out that despite the complex arguments presented before the
Court, the public presentation of the case featured a much more
straightforward sameness argument.' 8 The broader message was of the
equivalency of same-sex and opposite sex relationships; the more complex
legal argument did not translate into the public sphere deliberations.
TheMossop challenge contained both transgressive and normalizing
dimensions. It challenged the heteronormativity of dominant modalities of
family and legal personhood, and it was partially successful in so far as the
challenge made inroads in a strong dissent. The dissent, and the broader
debates provoked by the litigation, challenged the idea of sameness as the
basis for the recognition of same-sex families, insisting that equality did not
require assimilation into an idealized conception of family. At the same
time, the majority opinion subtly reinforced the heteronormativity of
dominant familial discourses: family status did not include same-sex
couples. The broader political message was a normalizing one of sameness
and assimilation.
15 See ibid.; Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, "What is Marriage-Like Like? The Irrelevance of
Conjugality" (2001) 18 Can. J. Fam. L. 269 [Cossman & Ryder, "What is Marriage-Like Like?"].
16 See Freeman, supra note 14. See also Nitya lyer, "Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the
Shaping of Social Identity" (1993) 19 Queen's L.J. 179.
17 See Herman, Rights of Passage, supra note 4 at 60-6 1, an interview with Brian Mossop.
18 Miriam Smith, Lesbian and Gay Rights in Canada: Social Movements and Equality-Seeking 1971-
1995 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 91.
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In the second same-sex equality rights case to reach the Supreme
Court, Egan v. Canada, a gay couple who had been together for forty-two
years challenged the refusal of the federal government to grant them a
spousal pension benefit under the OldAge SecurityAct,"9 on the ground that
they were not spouses.20 The Court unanimously held that sexual
orientation was a prohibited ground of discrimination under section 15 of
the Charter, even though it was not explicitly listed. In a 5-4 opinion, the
majority held that the equality rights of James Egan and John Norris Nesbit
had been violated. Writing for the majority on section 15, Justice Cory held
that the opposite sex definition of spouse in the federal Old Age Security
Act 21 discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and therefore
constituted a violation of Egan and Nesbit's equality rights. However, a very
different majority held that the violation was a reasonable limit within the
meaning of section 1. Four members of this majority found no violation of
section 15. The fifth, Justice Sopinka, was the swing vote. He agreed with
Justice Cory that section 15 was violated, but parted company with him at
the section 1 stage of the analysis, finding that the violation was a
reasonable limit. He held that since gays and lesbians were a fairly new
equality-seeking group, the government needed to be given some latitude
in deciding when and how to extend legal protections. In his view,
"government must be accorded some flexibility in extending social benefits
and does not have to be pro-active in recognizing new social relationships.
It is not realistic for the Court to assume that there are unlimited funds to
address the needs of all." 22
Doctrinally, Egan represented a groundbreaking victory within a
defeat. For the first time, the majority of the Court held that sexual
orientation was an analogous ground and that an opposite sex definition of
spouse constituted discrimination within the meaning of section 15.
However, the majority on section 15 was defeated on section 1 by Justice
Sopinka's fiscal conservatism. The fragility and partiality of the victory was
further underscored by the social conservatism of the dissenting opinion by
Justice La Forest on section 15. In his view, the exclusion of same-sex
couples was perfectly reasonable, given the importance of marriage and
marriage-like relationships in reproduction:
19 R.S.C. 1985, c. 0-9.
20 Egan, supra note 9.
21 Supra note 19, s. 2.
22 Egan, supra note 9 at 516.
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Marriage has from time immemorial been firmly grounded in our legal tradition, one that
is itself a reflection of long-standing philosophical and religious traditions. But its ultimate
raison d'etre transcends all of these and is firmly anchored in the biological and social realities
that heterosexual couples have the unique ability to procreate, that most children are the
product of those relationships, and that they are generally cared for and nurtured by those
who live in that relationship. In this sense, marriage is by nature heterosexual.23
Once again, differential treatment was justified in the name of
biological difference. Yet, as Carl Stychin has observed, "the fact that La
Forest J. found it necessary to articulate his wide-ranging defense of
heterosexual marriage (and 'traditional' families) suggests that the norm
may be somewhat 'troubled' by the public articulation of gay/lesbian
narratives such as those of Egan and Nesbit."2 4 And the tide had begun to
turn: only four of the nine justices signed on to this conservative vision. This
too represented a kind of incremental victory within a fragile legal defeat.
Strategically, the arguments in Egan were more assimilationist than
those in Mossop. While arguing that same-sex couples did not have to be
"just like" heterosexual couples, the argument remained one of functional
equivalency. The idea of sexual monogamy seemed to creep back in
implicitly to this functional equivalency. As Miriam Smith has observed,
"the optics of the Egan case certainly suggested a stable model of
homosexual coupledom, as the public presentation of the case highlighted
the fact that Egan and Nesbit had been partnered for over forty years. '
Politically, the impact of Egan was also contradictory. The defeat
hardened the resolve of much of the lesbian and gay community, mobilizing
support behind the demand for spousal recognition and rights. In the wake
of the social and fiscal conservatism that defeated the challenge, the denial
of basic formal equality seemed that much more egregious. The result was
to increasingly silence the dissent within the lesbian and gay community on
spousal rights and the contested issue of assimilation. It became
progressively more difficult to argue against same-sex relationship
recognition when the law's reasons for doing so were so profoundly
23 Ibid. at 515. See Lori G. Beaman, "Sexual Orientation and Legal Discourse: Legal
Constructions of the 'Normal' Family" (1999), 14 C.J.L.S. 173, who emphasizes the extent to which this
dissenting opinion, alongside Justice Sopinka's opinion, operated to reproduce dominant truths about
the normal family.
24 Carl F. Stychin, "Novel Concepts: A Comment on Egan and Nesbit v. the Queen" (1995) 6:4
Const. Forum Const. 101 at 105. See also Herman, Rights of Passage, supra note 4.
25 See Smith, supra note 18 at 92.
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conservative. 26
Doctrinally, strategically, and politically, the ruling in Egan
represented partial victories within partial defeats. Equality discourse was
in ascendance, but not yet sufficient to displace the hold of fiscal and social
conservatism. The equality dispute represented a profound challenge not
only to these conservative discourses, but to the heteronormativity of law
itself. Yet, the transgressive nature of the challenge was simultaneously
normalizing. The legal subjects that the challenge brought at least partially
onto the legal stage were being constituted in and through dominant
familial discourses.
III. THE TURNING POINT: VPRIEND
In Vriend v. Alberta,27 a science laboratory coordinator was fired
from his job at a Christian college because he was gay. Delwin Vriend
brought a challenge to the Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act2 for
failing to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of
discrimination. The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that the
IRPA violated section 15 of the Charter in its failure to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and that this was not a
reasonable limit on Vriend's equality rights. On the question of remedy,
eight members of the Court were of the view that this was one of those
exceptional cases where it was appropriate to cure the constitutional defect
by reading words into the statute. The Court added the words "sexual
orientation" to the list of grounds of discrimination prohibited by the
IRPA 29
Doctrinally, the case must be measured against the backdrop of the
decision of Justice McClung, writing for the majority of the Alberta Court
of Appeal, who had held that there was no government action to which the
Charter could apply (the omission of sexual orientation did not, in his view,
amount to government action), and that, in any case, there was nothing in
26 As Stychin has observed, supra note 24 at 105, the arguments for same-sex state benefits
provided very little room for a critique of the allocation of rights and responsibilities on the basis of
family status.
27 [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
28 R.S.A. 1980, c. 1-2 [IRPA].
29 Justice Major dissented from the majority opinion on this issue of remedy. In his view, the
Alberta government may prefer to have no human rights code at all rather than to have to include
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground. In his view, this was a choice better left to the legislature.
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the IRPA that distinguished between heterosexuals and homosexuals. °
Moreover, Justice McClung's decision was replete with discourse of the
critics of judicial activism, denouncing "constitutionally-hyperactive
judges"31 and the "creeping barrage of the special-interest constituencies
that now seem to have conscripted the Charter."32 The Supreme Court
firmly rejected this neo-conservative attempt to deploy the discourse of
privacy and formal equality to preempt the extension of equality rights.
Furthermore, the Court attempted to engage with the critics of judicial
activism, articulating its role in promoting democratic values.
Measured doctrinally, Vriend appears to be an unadulterated legal
victory. It was groundbreaking because it was the first time that the majority
of the Court held that the denial of formal equality to lesbians and gay men
was not only a violation of section 15, but also not a reasonable limit within
section 1. Moreover, the Court did not simply strike down the offending
provisions of the legislation, but went so far as to use the reading-in
remedy. The decision represents an unequivocal statement of the formal
equality of individual lesbians and gay men. Vriend was a sign of the future:
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was not going to survive
constitutional scrutiny.
However, Vriend's own victory was partial; the case did not address
his substantive complaint against his employer, but rather, he won the right
to have his case heard before the Alberta Human Rights Tribunal. Nor did
the case resolve some of the difficult issues of balancing the conflicting
rights between the right to equality of lesbians and gay men and the right
to freedom of religion of fundamentalist Christian colleges.33
Further, some of the broader political implications of the victory
are demonstrably more fragile and contradictory. Some members of the
provincial government in Alberta, echoed by the voices of social
conservatism across the country, denounced the decision and the Court.
Many demanded that the legislature invoke the notwithstanding clause in
section 33 of the Charter. Although his cabinet was divided, Premier Ralph
Klein ultimately decided not to invoke the notwithstanding clause, though
he tried to spin the ruling as a "very narrow decision, giving people the right
to go to the Human Rights Commission on issues like residency,
30 Vriend v. Alberta (1996), 181 A.R. 16 (C.A.).
31 Ibid. at 26.
3 2 
Ibid. at 31.
33Rebecca Johnson & Thomas Kuttner, "Treading on Dicey Ground" in Carl Stychin & Didi
Herman, eds., Sexuality in the LegalArena (London: Athlone Press, 2000) 181.
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employment and services."34 But the debate continued unabated, with
critics of judicial activism and gay rights in full gear.3 ' The decision sparked
a broader debate about the desirability of invoking section 33, which would
eventually lead to the passage of the Constitutional Referendum Act,36 which
provided that the government would hold a referendum prior to invoking
the notwithstanding clause. Politically, the Vriend decision can be seen to
have significantly contributed to the critique of judicial activism that has
permeated mainstream media. It has also contributed to political and legal
discourse, notwithstanding the Court's own effort to diffuse this critique.
While Vriend may represent a legal victory, it has added fuel to the
powerful backlash that has rapidly become a part of the popular legal
discourse.
IV. THE HIGH WATER MARK: SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIP
EQUALITY
The fourth case, M. v. H. ,37 involved two women who lived together
in a same-sex relationship for ten years. When their relationship broke
down, M. brought an application for spousal support against H. under the
Family Law Act.38 Section 29 of the FLA defined the term "spouse" to
include unmarried opposite sex couples "who had cohabited ...
continuously for a period of not less than three years., 39 M. challenged the
constitutionality of the definition of spouse, arguing that the exclusion of
same-sex couples violated section 15 of the Charter. H. was joined by the
Ontario government and many right-wing organizations who intervened to
support the constitutionality of the existing definition of spouse.
34 Joe Woodard, "A Narrow Decision?" British Columbia Report (20 April 1998) 24. However,
Klein did defend the Court's ruling, specifically stating that it is "morally wrong to discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation." See Joe Woodard, "Ralph gets moral, and Alberta gets gay rights: How
Klein snookered public opinion to satisfy homosexuals, the Supreme Court and the media" Alberta
Report (20 April 1998) at 17.
35 See e.g. David Frum, "Regulating Freedom of Conscience: Our Rule of Law is Lacking
Objectivity" The Financial Post (21 April 1998) 19; K. Steel, "One Surrender Too Many: Klein's
Capitulation on Vriend Prompts Talk of a Right-wing Revolt" British Columbia Report (4 May 1998) 13;
K. Steel, "Rally 'round the family: sceptical of Klein's promised 'fences': CFAC keeps the heat on with
rallies and a petition" Alberta Report (25 May 1998) 9.
36 R.S.A. 2000, c. C-25.
3 7 M. v. H., supra note 9.
38 R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 [FL4].
Ibid.
20021
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 40, NOS. 3 & 4
In yet another groundbreaking decision, a majority of the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the opposite sex definition of spouse
discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and was not a reasonable
limit on equality rights. The principal majority opinion was written by
Justices Cory and lacobucci. Justice Cory, writing the section 15 portion of
their joint opinion, held that same-sex relationships may be conjugal within
the meaning of section 29 of the FLA. Moreover, section 29 violates the
human dignity of lesbian and gay couples by promoting the view that they are
"less worthy of recognition and protection" and "incapable of forming
intimate relationships of economic interdependence as compared to opposite-
sex couples."'' Further, the exclusion of same-sex couples in the FLA further
"perpetuates the disadvantages suffered by individuals in same-sex
relationships and contributes to the erasure of their existence.""' The Court
therefore concluded that the definition of spouse in section 29 of the FLA was
in violation of section 15 of the Charter.
Justice lacobucci, writing the section 1 portion of the joint opinion,
held that the exclusion of same-sex couples was not rationally related to the
objectives underlying the spousal support provisions of the FLA. He
characterized the objectives of theFLA as promoting "the equitable resolution
of economic disputes that arise when intimate relationships between
individuals who have been financially interdependent break down 4 2 and
the alleviation of "the burden on the public purse by shifting the obligation
to provide support for needy persons to those parents and spouses who
have the capacity to provide support to these individuals."43 He held that
these objectives would only be furthered if same-sex couples were included
within the definition of spouse.44 On the question of remedy, Justice
Iacobucci was of the view that, unlike Vriend, the "reading in" remedy would
be inappropriate in this case.45 Instead, he declared section 29 to be of no
force and effect, with a suspension of the operation of the declaration of
invalidity for six months to enable the legislature to consider ways of
bringing this provision, and other laws, into conformity with the equality
4 0 M. v. H.,supra note 9 at 57.
41 Ibid. at 57-58.
42 Ibid. at 7.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. at 67. See also ibid. at 72.
45 Ibid. at 10. See also Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, "M. v. H.: Time to Clean up your Acts"
(1999) 10:3 Const. Forum Const. 59, on the unpersuasive reasoning on remedy.
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rights in the Charter.46
The decision in M. v. H. was groundbreaking. The Court recognized
the legitimacy of gay and lesbian relationships and held that those
relationships are entitled to legal protection. Within six years, the spirit of
the powerful dissent from Mossop had become the majority opinion. Only
one member of the Court, Justice Gonthier, echoed the social conservatism
of the Justice La Forest dissenting view of equality rights in Egan.
Otherwise, the neo-conservative vision of the family that had until recently
defeated these challenges was now displaced by the powerful discourse of
formal equality.47
In the aftermath of M. v. H., the Conservative government in
Ontario reluctantly introduced legislation to grant rights and to impose
responsibilities on same-sex couples. In An Act to Amend Certain Statutes
Because of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in M. v. H.,48 the
government amended sixty-seven statutes to include "same sex partners."
The federal government subsequently enacted the Modernization of Benefits
and Obligations Act,49 which amended federal statutes to include "common
law partners"-unmarried couples of the same or different sex-on the
same basis as unmarried heterosexual couples. Other provinces have been
following suit.5" The powerful discourse of formal equality was effectively
forced onto the legislatures."
Both doctrinally and politically, M. v. H. represents an important
victory for formal equality, that is, however, also partial, fragile, and
contradictory. Doctrinally, it is a cautious decision that appeared sensitive
46 M. v. H., supra note 9 at 87.
See Brenda Cossman, "Family Feuds: Neo Liberal and Neo Conservative Visions of the
Reprivatization Project" in Brenda Cossman & Judy Fudge, eds., Privatization, Law and the Challenge
to Feminism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, forthcoming 2002) [Cossman, "Family Feuds"].
48 S.O. 1999, c. 6.
49
S.C. 2000, c. 12 [Modernization Act].
50At the federal level, see ibid. At the provincial level: British Columbia: Definition of Spouse
Amendment Act, 2000, S.B.C. 2000, c. 24; Alberta: Bill 30, Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, 2d
Sess., 25th Leg., Alberta, 2002; Saskatchewan: Miscellaneous Statutes (Domestic Relations) Amendment
Act, 2001, S.S. 2001, c. 50 and Miscellaneous Statutes (Domestic Relations) Amendment Act, 2001 (No.
2) S.S. 2001, c. 51; Manitoba: Act to Comply with the Supreme Court of Canada Decision in M. v. H., S.M.
2001, c. 37; Quebec: An Act to Amend Various Legislative Provisions Concerning defacto Spouses, S.Q.
1999, c. 14 and An Act Instituting Civil Unions and Establishing New Rules of Filiation, S.Q. 2002, c. 6;
New Brunswick: An Act to Amend the Family Services Act, S.N.B. 2000, c. 59; Nova Scotia: Law Reform
(2000) Act, S.N.S. 2000, c. 29; Newfoundland: An Act to Amend the Family Law Act, S.N. 2000, c. 29.
Cossman, "Family Feuds," supra note 47.
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to the charges of judicial activism that would inevitably be directed at the
ruling. For example, Justices Cory and Iacobucci were both emphatic that
the ruling was not about marriage. Unlike Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's
dissenting opinion in Mossop, the ruling cleaves very closely to the technical
elements of section 15 and section 1 jurisprudence, steering clear of any
broader discussion of family social policy, changing family demographics,
or family diversity. The ruling was also cautious in its avoidance of the
"reading in" remedy which had proven so controversial in Vriend.
The cautious nature of the ruling in many ways reflects the
arguments of M., as well as the intervenors supporting the challenge. When
compared to the arguments in Mossop and Egan, the arguments made by
these litigants were decidedly more assimilationist-same-sex couples were,
for all intents and purposes, just like opposite sex couples. The debates that
had animated the submissions in Mossop, and to a lesser extent Egan,
attempting to mitigate the assimilationist arguments, seem to have been
marginalized in the face of the losses in the intervening years. While at least
some of the intervenors tried to address this concern,52 the overall
arguments were much more driven by the discourses of sameness. The
contradictory nature of the strategies thus comes into view: the formal
equality arguments had resonance with the Court, but the cost of this
resonance was a resignation to the unreconstructed discourses of sameness.
In the aftermath of M. v. H., gay and lesbian legal activists have
turned their attention to the final frontier of same-sex relationship equality:
marriage. Strategically, this was the plan all along for many of the
activists-to pursue incremental equality by developing the jurisprudence
in relation to unmarried cohabitants, and only turning to marriage once
that victory was in hand. After M. v. H., this shift to marriage, with its
unapologetically assimilationist agenda, represents a less radical shift than
from the earlier days of Mossop and Egan, where at least some of the
litigants were explicitly concerned with resisting a politics of sameness.
Politically, the story is also decidedly more fragile and
contradictory. The decision in M v. H. further fueled the fires of a
conservative backlash that condemned judicial activism and mobilized in
defence of marriage. Neo-conservative politicians assailed the ruling as
anti-democratic. One Reform Party Member of Parliament called the
ruling "one of the most outrageous exercises of raw judicial power in the
52 See Boyd, "Family, Law and Sexuality," supra note 4, discussing the intervention of LEAF in M.
v. H., supra note 9.
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history of modern democracy." 53 He said, "responsible government itself is
threatened by judicial usurpation of the role of elected legislators."54 The
judicial activism critique was echoed throughout the mainstream Canadian
media. In some, it was represented as one amongst a range of diverse
opinions about the decision. In others, like the National Post or theAlberta
Report, it became front page news, and the only really legitimate lens
through which to view the decision. The Supreme Court's ruling
strengthened the resolve and the momentum of this backlash.
The fragility of the victory was further revealed by the fact that
within a few days of the decision, the federal government approved a
motion by a vote of 216-55, brought by the Reform Party stating that "it is
necessary to state that marriage is and should remain the union of one man
and one woman to the exclusion of all others," and that Parliament "will
take all necessary steps" within its jurisdiction "to preserve this definition of
marriage in Canada."55 While the motion was entirely symbolic-it had no
legal force-it was important precisely for its symbolicvalue. When the federal
government introduced the Modernization Act, the minister of justice agreed
to add a definition of marriage to the bill, once again defined as "the union of
one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others."'56
The ruling in M v. H. must also be evaluated within the broader
context of neo-liberalism's politics of privatization." Same-sex couples won
the right to sue each other when their relationships break down. This was
not a case that involved the extension of government or employer benefits,
but rather, it was the kind of equality case that fit perfectly with an agenda
of fiscal responsibility. The result of the ruling was to expand the scope of
spousal support obligations, and thereby reduce demands on the state.
Indeed, the Court emphasized that one of the goals of the spousal support
provisions was "reducing the strain on the public purse" by "shifting the
financial burden away from the government and on to those partners with the
53 Quoted in Carmen Wittmeier, "Playing House: Politicians Cower as the Supreme Court
Overrides the Natural Family Order"Alberta Report (31 May 1999) 20 at 24.
54 Ibid.
55 House of Commons Debates, 36 h Parliament, IV Session, 240 (8 June 1999) at 1020.
5 6 ModemizationAct, supra note 49, s. 1.1. Alberta went further, passing the Marriage Amendment
Act, S.A. 2000, c. 3, which defined marriage as "a marriage between a man and a woman," and invoked
the notwithstanding clause, providing that the law overrode the provisions in sections 2 and 7-15 of the
Charter.
57See Susan B. Boyd, "Best Friends or Spouses? Privatization and the Recognition of Lesbian
Relationships in M v. H" (1996) 13 Can. J. Fam. L. 321; Boyd, "Family, Law and Sexuality," supra note
4; Cossman, "Family Feuds," supra note 47.
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capacity to provide support for dependent spouses.""8 The ruling is consistent
with the politics of reprivatization-a process in which the costs of social
reproduction are being shifted from the public to private spheres and the
family is being reconstituted as the natural site of economic dependency. 9
Yet even within this neo-liberal politics of privatizing the costs of
social reproduction, the political implications of M v. H. are contradictory.
While the ruling did reinforce this agenda of fiscal and familial responsibility,
the ensuing legislative enactments extended formal equality to a broad range
of government rights and responsibilities. While in the wake of the demise of
the welfare state, there are rather fewer rights left, those rights are now
equally extended to opposite sex and same-sex couples alike.
Finally, while the ruling in M v. H. has absorbed the lesbian subject
into the discourses of conjugality, it has also led to a further questioning and
destabilizing of the very category of conjugality.' While the Court endorsed
the functional equivalency approach to conjugality, with its "generally
accepted characteristics of shared shelter, sexual and personal behavior,
services, social activities, economic support and children, as well as the
societal perception of the couple,"'" Justice Cory observed that a conjugal
relationship could exist even in the absence of a sexual relationship. It is an
observation that begins to undermine the very distinction between conjugal
and non-conjugal relationships on which legislative definitions of spouse
and common law partner rest. If the existence of a sexual relationship is no
longer the marker of a conjugal relationship, it becomes difficult to sustain
the legal recognition of only conjugal relationships. This destabilizing of
conjugality has contributed to a broader rethinking of the legal regulation
of adult personal relationships.62
Like other same-sex relationship recognition cases, the challenge
in M v. H. was profoundly contradictory, containing both transgressive and
normalizing dimensions. Equality discourses were now in ascendance,
58 M. v. H., supra note 9 at 69.
See supra note 47. See also Judy Fudge & Brenda Cossman, "Introduction: Privatization, Law
and the Challenge to Feminism" in Cossman & Fudge, supra note 47 [Fudge & Cossman, "Challenge
to Feminism"].
Cossman & Ryder,"What is Marriage-Like Like?," supra note 15.
6 1 M. v. H., supra note 9 at 50 (citingMolodowich v. Penttinen (1980), 17 R.F.L. (2d) 376 (Ont. Dist.
Ct.)).
62 See Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal
Adult Relationships (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2001). See also Cossman & Ryder, "What
is Marriage-Like Like?," supra note 15.
Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Charter
having displaced the discourses of social conservatism. The
heteronormativity of the familial subject had also been dislodged. Yet the
very discourses within which the new legal subject was being recognized
were normalizing. The lesbian and gay legal subject was a familial subject,
a subject recognized in and through dominant familial discourses. While the
heteronormativity of the family may have been challenged, its role in an
increasingly privatized world has not, and lesbian and gay subjects have
been absorbed into this family. Similarly, while the seeds have been sown
for a broader rethinking of conjugality, there is a risk it may lead to little
more than a further expansion of the scope of the family and its role as the
privileged site of social reproduction.
V. WHAT ABOUT SEX AND EXPRESSION? LI7TLE SISTERS
BOOKSTORE
In Little Sisters Bookstore and Art Emporium v. Canada,63 a gay and
lesbian bookstore in Vancouver brought a constitutional challenge against
Canada Customs. For fifteen years, Canada Customs had been detaining
and seizing shipments on route to the bookstore. In a protracted legal
battle, Little Sisters argued that Canada Customs was unfairly targeting gay
and lesbian materials headed to gay and lesbian bookstores. The bookstore
challenged both the administrative practices of Canada Customs, as well as
the provisions of the Tariff Code' that empower customs officials to detain
materials that are obscene within the meaning of section 163(8) of the
Criminal Code,65 arguing that the law violated the right to freedom of
expression in section 2(b) and the right to equality in section 15 of the
Charter.
The Supreme Court held that Little Sisters did suffer differential
treatment when compared to other bookstores that imported heterosexual
sexually explicit material, and that this differential treatment was
discriminatory. "[T]he adverse treatment meted out by Canada Customs to
the appellants violated their legitimate sense of self-worth and human
dignity. The Customs treatment was high-handed and dismissive of the
appellants' right to receive lawful expressive material ....,,66 In commenting
63 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 [Little Sisters].
64 CustomsAct, R.S.C. 1985 (2d Supp.), c. 1, s. 1; Customs Tariff, R.S.C. 1985 (3d Supp.), c. 41, as
rep. by Customs Tariff, S.C. 1997, c. 36, s. 213.
65 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
66 Little Sisters, supra note 63 at 1125.
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on the "overzealous censorship" of Canada Customs, the Court held that
"Little Sisters was targeted because it was considered 'different'."67 But the
Court concluded that there was nothing on the face of the legislation itself
that encouraged this discriminatory treatment. The discrimination occurred
at the administrative level of implementation. The Customs' legislation was,
in the Court's view, capable of being implemented in a manner that did not
violate Charter rights.
On the question of the administration of the Customs regime, the
Court concluded that Little Sisters had been unfairly targeted and had
suffered "excessive and unnecessary prejudice in terms of delays, cost and
other losses"" at the hands of Customs. It held that Customs officers were
inadequately trained and that Customs had failed to establish appropriate
deadlines and criteria. However, the Court refused to provide a remedy for
this failure. The majority noted that many changes had been made by
Customs in the intervening six years, and that in the absence of more
detailed information, it was not prepared to conclude that these changes
were inadequate. In the majority's view, Little Sisters could always launch
a further action in the courts if they considered such action necessary.
Little Sisters Bookstore and some of the intervenors claimed that
the ruling was a partial victory-their claim to harassment and
discrimination at the hands of Customs was vindicated. But this partial
victory was contained within what was otherwise a resounding defeat. The
power of Customs to censor sexually explicit materials at the border was
upheld and the Butler69 test for obscenity was reaffirmed. Moreover,
virtually no remedy was provided for the administrative discrimination.
Unlike the preceding cases, Little Sisters was not just about gay and
lesbian equality; it was also about sexual freedom and sexual expression.
Little Sisters and some of the intervenors emphasized the importance of
sexual freedom and sexually expressive materials for lesbian and gay
identity and community. It was simultaneously a claim to sameness and
difference. As an equality claim, it was about the right to be free from
harassment and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It was
about the right to be treated the same. But, as an expression claim, Little
Sisters was an assertion of difference. It was an assertion of lesbian and gay
sex-the very aspect of lesbian and gay identity that marks difference. Little
Sisters, and some of the intervenors, attempted to translate this difference
6 7 
Ibid.
68 Ibid. at 1202.
69 R. v. Butler, 11992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [Butler].
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into law. For example, the bookstore tried to limit the applicability of the
Butler harms-based test to heterosexual material, arguing that lesbian and
gay sexuality and sexually explicit representations are different. ° Little
Sisters tried to negotiate this treacherous terrain between sameness and
difference, equality and freedom, by insisting on the intersecting nature of
the equality and freedom of expression violations.
Nevertheless, Little Sisters' strategic efforts were defeated by the
dominance of the sameness paradigm. The very success of the strategies in
the earlier equality rights jurisprudence and its paradigm of formal equality
now seemed to operate as an epistemic obstacle" t-the Court could not see
past sameness to appreciate the importance of the freedom claim, nor the
subtlety of the intersectional claim. Persuaded by the politics of sameness,
the Court could not now accept an argument premised on the politics of
difference. While paying lip service to the importance of sexual expression,
it could not justify a departure from the equality norm of sameness. Nor
could it trump the equality interests (that is, the alleged harm to women)
that justified the legal regulation of obscenity. In the paradigm deployed by
the Court, not only were equality and freedom distinct, but in the context
of sexual speech, they seemed to be mutually exclusive.
Little Sisters demonstrates the partiality and fragility of lesbian and
gay rights challenges. Only the equality claim had resonance with the Court,
and, even then, not enough resonance to result in a remedy. The freedom
claim, fundamental to lesbian and gay sexual politics, was unavailing' This
broader sexual politics continues to be a highly contested terrain in which
lesbian and gay sexuality remains subject to surveillance and control. Highly
sexualized arenas-gay bars, gay strip clubs, lesbian bathhouses-have
continued to be subject to police harassment and criminal regulation. In the
last few years, criminal charges as well as provincial liquor license laws have
been used to regulate lesbian and gay sexuality. In these areas, lesbian and
70 Little Sisters Bookstore and Art Emporium v. Canada, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1120 (Factum of the
Appellant at 61-73). For a discussion of this issue and the Court's refusal to place lesbian and gay
materials into context, see Joe-Anne Pickle, "Taking Big Brother to Court: Little Sisters Book and Art
Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice)" (2001) 59 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 349.
71J.-F. Gaudreault-Desbiens, "Gaston Bachelard and Legal Theory" (Paper presented at the
American Law and Society Association and Canadian Law and Society Association, Joint Conference,
Vancouver, May 2002) [unpublished].
72 In recent years, the Toronto police have raided and laid charges at Remington's (a gay strip
club), The Bijou (a gay porn bar), The Barn (a gay bar holding a special event for a men's nudist
organization), and Pussy Palace (a special-events lesbian bathhouse). Criminal charges were laid against
Remington's (convicted of indecent performance) and The Bijou (charges later dropped), whereas
violations pursuant to the Liquor License Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L. 19, were charged against The Barn
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gay rights claims continue to be cast within what William Eskridge calls a
politics of protection-a defensive politics intended to protect lesbian and
gay spaces from state intrusion.73 While the politics of protection has made
considerable inroads since the days of the bathhouse raids in the early
1980s, lesbian and gay sexuality still attracts the attention of the moral
regulators. As the same-sex family subject is increasingly recognized in law,
the highly eroticized subject of gay bars and bathhouses continues to be
constituted as an outlaw.
At the same time, Little Sisters garnered considerable public
support during its struggle against Canada Customs. The struggle had a
"David and Goliath"-like stature in which a gutsy little bookstore refused
to bow down to the persistent and pernicious harassment of the powerful
and often invisible bureaucracy. The legal intervention mobilized a broad
coalition of civil libertarians, artists, writers, and feminists who intervened
to support the lesbian and gay rights challenge. While the freedom of sexual
expression claim was resulted in no immediate legal victory, the Court did
provide importers with some legal resources that could help rein in
Customs censorship in the years ahead.74
The political legacy of Little Sisters is also mixed. Canada's troubled
regime of border censorship drew sustenance and legitimacy from the
implausible seal of approval it received from the Court. The result may be
more barriers to imported representations of minority sexual practices in
the years to come. At the same time, the Little Sisters litigation advanced
the legitimacy of the political claim to sexual freedom, and, for the first
time, the Supreme Court affirmed the value of lesbian and gay sexual
expression. When measured against these broader political mobilizations
and discursive contestations, partial and fragile victory emerges alongside
defeat in this case. While legal regulation leans towards normalization of
lesbian and gay subjects, the broader political implications inject some
instability into the process.
And the story is not finished. Despite tile widespread public support
and fifteen years of legal battles, the bookstore is back where it started-in
court battling further detentions. The contradictory story of normalization
and subversion continues.
(acquitted) and Pussy Palace (charges stayed due to violation of constitutional rights).
73 William N. Eskridge Jr., Equality Practice: Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights (New York:
Routledge, 2002) at 1.
74See Bruce Ryder, "The Little Sisters Case, Administrative Censorship, and Obscenity Law"
(2001), 39 Osgoode Hall L.J. 207.
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VI. CONFLICTING RIGHTS: RELIGION VERSUS SEXUALITY
The last case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada was not
initiated by lesbian and gay litigants, but rather by a religious institution
that opposed lesbian and gay rights. Trinity Western University v. British
Columbia College of Teachers75 involved a difficult balancing of the equality
rights of gays and lesbians with the religious liberties of a Christian
educational institution. The British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT)
refused to approve the teacher training program of Trinity Western
University (TWU), a private religious institution associated with the
Evangelical Free Church of Canada, on the ground that the university
followed discriminatory practices, and therefore the approval was not in the
public interest. The BCCT was concerned with the list of "Practices That are
Biblically Condemned," which included "sexual sins including ...
homosexual behavior."76 All TWU students were required to sign a
document in which they refused to participate in such activities.
The Supreme Court held that the BCCT had jurisdiction to consider
discriminatory practices in assessing TWUs application. Justices Iacobucci
and Bastarache, writing for the majority, held that even though TWU is a
private institution and is exempted in part from the provincial human rights
legislation and the Charter, the BCCT was entitled to consider these
instruments to determine whether it would be in the public interest to allow
public school teachers to be trained at TWU. In the Court's view, the
difficulty at the heart of the appeal was how to reconcile the religious
freedoms of individuals who wished to attend TWU with the equality
concerns of students in British Columbia's public school system.
The Court held that any potential conflict could be resolved
through a proper definition of the scope of the rights involved. Neither
freedom of religion nor equality rights are absolute. While the BCCT was
right to consider the impact of TWUs policy on the public school
environment, it did not sufficiently consider the impact of its decision on
the right to freedom of religion of the members of TWU. Any restriction of
freedom of religion must be justified by evidence that the exercise of this
freedom will have a detrimental impact on the public school system.
The Court held that a line should be drawn between "belief and
conduct. The freedom to hold beliefs is broader than the freedom to act on
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 [Trinity Western].
76 Ibi. at 785.
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them."" The BCCT does not require that public universities with teacher
education programs screen out individuals with sexist, racist, or
homophobic views. Acting on beliefs is a different matter, however, and
discriminatory conduct would not be tolerated. According to the Court,
there was no evidence that graduates of the TWU would treat gays and
lesbians in a discriminatory manner. BCCT had thus acted on the basis of
irrelevant considerations-that is, religious beliefs, not the actual impact of
these beliefs on the public school environment. Therefore the order of
mandamus issued by the lower court allowing approval of TWUs proposed
teacher training program for five years was justified.
Trinity Western is a difficult case to assess from the perspective of
lesbian and gay rights challenges. Doctrinally, the ruling was a partial
victory for lesbian and gay students whose rights to be treated with respect
was upheld. But, it was also a partial victory for the religious college, and
for religious minorities more generally in that freedom of thought was
vindicated, while freedom to act on those thoughts curtailed. The conflict
in Trinity Western is paradigmatic of many cases on the multicultural
horizon in which religion and equality will collide.78 Doctrinally, it is unclear
how helpful the distinction between conduct and belief is likely to be in
resolving these conflicts. The Court has carved out in very abstract terms
a private sphere of religious freedom which must coexist with the public
sphere and its norms of equality. It does little to resolve the conflict in this
coexistence, or to make concrete the terms of the relationship.
Trinity Western also raises difficult strategic concerns. The challenge
was not brought by lesbian and gay litigants, but by a private religious
college that objected to the disqualification of its students by the BCCT. It
raises questions about when lesbian and gay litigants should intervene in
cases that are not directly driven by their legal and political agenda but
which nonetheless have implications for lesbian and gay equality. Further,
it raises questions about the extent to which lesbian and gay groups should
7 7 Ibid. at 775.
78In Hall (Litigation Guardian of) v. Powers (2002), 213 D.L.R. (4th) 308 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), 19-
year-old Mark Hall won an injunction against the Durham Catholic District School Board, allowing him
to bring his same-sex boyfriend to his high school prom. The school board refused to grant him
permission because homosexuality is against the teachings of the Catholic Church. While an Ontario
court granted the injunction, the issue remains unresolved, as the school board considers whether to
pursue the matter. At issue is the scope of religious liberties of the Catholic schools, protected under
section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
See also Brockie v. Ontario (H.R C.), [2001] O.J. No. 5316 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (QL); Chamberlain v. Surrey
School District No. 36 (2000), 80 B.C.L.R. (3d) 181 (C.A.), appeal heard by Supreme Court of Canada,
12 June 2002.
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argue that their right to equality should trump the right to religious
freedom. Pitting equality against freedom has dangerous implications that
can easily come back to haunt lesbian and gay politics. In Little Sisters, the
Court was only too willing to let equality trump freedom. While sexual and
religious freedoms may often times seem incommensurable, a politics of
sexual freedom may need to be attentive to the contradictory overlaps of
spheres of personal autonomy and self-determination. The progress
narrative of formal equality simply will not provide answers in this terrain.
The strategic and political implications of the case must also be measured
against the restrictions on personal autonomy-restrictions which are both
partial (conduct curtailed, thought vindicated) and contradictory (the
autonomy of one group curtailed in the interests of the autonomy of
another).
Yet there is also a degree of incommensurability between sexual
and religious freedoms. The history of lesbian and gay rights challenges is
also a history of the mobilization of many conservative religious
organizations who have opposed these challenges in the name of religion.79
These challenges have spawned what William Eskridge calls a new politics
of preservation°-resentment with liberal issues such as abortion, no-fault
divorce, and teenage sexuality, which threatened the traditional family,
found a new lightening rod in its opposition to gay rights and same-sex
relationship recognition.
In the Canadian context, the mobilization of these religious
organizations has not been particularly successful in preventing formal
equality and same-sex relationship recognition in the judicial arenas.
Religious belief has not impeded the recognition of formal equality rights
in the public sphere; however, this extension of formal equality has
continued to mobilize an organized resistance which seeks to articulate its
vision in the discourse of law.
It is this type of organized resistance that may have more legal and
political resonance in cases like Trinity Western where equality and religion
collide not only in the public sphere but also in the religious sphere. While
religion may not be able to dictate the treatment of lesbians and gay men
in the public sphere, cases like Trinity Western are generating broader legal
and political debates about the extent to which the secular values of
equality can and should govern beliefs and conduct within the religious
79 See Herman, Rights of Passage, supra note 4; Didi Herman, TheAntigayAgenda: Orthodox Vision
and the Christian Right (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
80 Eskridge, supra note 73 at 9-12.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 40, NOS. 3 & 4
sphere. The extent to which a sphere of religious liberty should be
immunized from the dictates of the secular world is highly contested and
can be expected to reappear in conflicts to come, from the ordaining of gay
priests to same-sex marriage.
Doctrinally, strategically, and politically, Trinity Western is a highly
contradictory case which defies classification as a victory or defeat for
lesbian and gay equality rights. It is a case with normalizing, and perhaps
subtly transgressive, implications. Trinity Western involved the
administrative practices of a mainstream institution that had been
mainstreaming equality concerns. While these mainstreaming practices of
the college were intended to address the experience of lesbian and gay
students and might be seen to challenge the heteronormativity of the
student subject, there is, at the same time, a concern with the assimilation
and normalization of the experience of these subjects who were all but
invisible in the case.
VII. VICTORIES, DEFEATS, AND NEW LEGAL SUBJECTS
The legacy of the first twenty years of the Charter for lesbians and
gay men is a legacy of victories and defeats, of a transformation in the legal
and political landscape, in which many lesbians and gay men are accorded
greater legal protection and in which others are not accorded the protection
that they desire. It is a legacy in which a vision of formal equality rights has
been vindicated and in which sexual freedom rights remain largely
unprotected. It is a legacy in which lesbians and gay men are being
reconstituted in law, where some lesbians and gay men are being newly
constituted as legal subjects in law, while others are being reinscribed as
outlaws. It is a legacy of transgression and normalization; these new legal
subjects are simultaneously challenging dominant modes of legal
subjectivity and heteronormativity and being absorbed within them.
The progress of formal equality in same-sex relationship
recognition, which reached its apogee in M. v. H., has brought a new lesbian
and gay legal subject on stage. It is a subject constituted in and through the
discourses of formal equality-a radically different subject than the lesbian
and gay subject that was constituted in and through the conservative
discourses of deviance, biology, and exclusion. This new legal subject is then
a radical one, challenging and displacing the heteronormativity of legal
subjectivity in the familial context. But the process of inclusion is at the
same time a normalizing strategy in which gays and lesbians are
reconstituted through the discourses of sameness. It is a process of
assimilation, of reconstituting gay and lesbian subjects into the dominant
legal narratives and ideologies, and of simultaneously excluding those
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subjects who do not conform. The process of inclusion is therefore always
also a process of exclusion that operates to police and discipline the borders
of the new legal subject.
The new legal subject is a familialized subject. The new lesbian and
gay subject lives in a monogamous and respectable relationship with
responsibilities of mutual care and commitment. It is a subject constituted
in and through ideologically dominant discourses of familialism at the same
time as this subject reshapes these discourses. Ideologically dominant
discourses of family have emphasized the heterosexual nuclear family as the
basic and natural site for social reproduction-for producing and raising
children and caring for dependent members. With the rise of the neo-
liberal state and its emphasis on reprivatization, there is rather less
emphasis given to the composition of the family (who a family is) and
rather more importance given to the functions that a family performs (what
a family does).8' The incorporation of lesbian and gay subjects into these
ideologically dominant discourses of family is illustrative of this new
emphasis on function over form and suggests that the traditional
heterosexuality of these discourses is being displaced.
At the same time, the incorporation of lesbian and gay subjects
reinforces this privatized model, with its emphasis on the family as the
natural site of caregiving and support. The incorporation of the lesbian and
gay legal subject into these dominant discourses of family reconstitutes
these discourses and the legal subjects themselves in significant ways.
Lesbian and gay subjects are legitimated through their familialization at the
same time as familialism is further legitimated by its apparent adaptability
to equality norms. The incorporation of the lesbian and gay subject into the
folds of familialism further obscures the extent to which the family remains
a highly gendered institution in which women provide a disproportionate
amount of unpaid labour. The new familialized lesbian and gay subject is
then one that both subverts the heteronormativity of ideologically dominant
discourses of family at the same time as it normalizes these discourses.82
The new legal subject is also a desexualized subject. Indeed, in M.
v. H., the lesbian subject was perfectly desexualized-the couple was
separated, so the spectre of lesbian sex all but disappeared from view.
Moreover, the importance of sex to the very category of conjugality has
begun to fade from view. The lesbian and gay subject then arrives on stage
at the very moment that the sexualized nature of the conjugal subject
81
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becomes less central. While the presence of sex cannot completely
vanish-same-sex couples do have sex-the lesbian and gay subject is
reconstituted through the discourses of "good" sex: monogamous, private,
and quasi-marital.
The respectability of the new legal subjects requires this careful
policing of the borders of recognition. The new legal subject is not the
erotically charged subject of the gay bars and bathhouses who remains a
sexual outlaw. The inclusion of gay and lesbian subjects into law is being
regulated at its margins to ensure that the "others"-the sexually
promiscuous, sexually public, and sexually non-monogamous-remain
outlaws. In Little Sisters, sex, sexuality, and sexually explicit representations
continued to be subject to regulatory surveillance, according to the good
sex/bad sex legacy of the Butler decision.8 ' And despite the Court's
insistence to the contrary, the legacy is one of heteronormativity. The
erotically charged lesbian or gay man-the body that exudes sexual desire
and delights in sexual pleasure-is a body at risk, a sexual other, an
outsider. The inclusion of the familialized subject requires the exclusion of
this sexualized body, a body which refuses to discipline itself in the law's
terms.
And yet, the exclusion is contested as the sexualized bodies
continue to demand their right to exist on their own terms and as the
politics of protectionism and its traditional sexual morality are cast into
increasing disrepute. The process of exclusion, on which the new legal
subject is premised, is itself fragile, partial, and contradictory, producing
resistance from within and without. The process of exclusion then generates
not only its own dynamics of transgression but also its own peculiar
dynamics of assimilation.
The legacy of the first twenty years of the Charter is, then, a legacy
of multiple and contradictory victories and defeats. At the doctrinal,
strategic, and political levels, the legacy is profoundly contradictory. Formal
equality has been won. Lesbian and gay subjects are now constituted in and
through the discourses of formal legal equality. Discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is no longer acceptable within the legal landscape.
While these are formidable victories for a community that was long cast as
deviant and despicable, the victories are not unequivocal. The powerful
backlash that has been mobilized highlights the fragility of lesbian and gay
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rights victories. The inclusion of some subjects at the exclusion of others
illustrates the partiality of the victories. And the extent to which the new
legal subject reinforces a privatized model of familial relationships
demonstrates the contradictory nature of these victories. The legacy of the
first twenty years of the Charter is one that has produced a complex new
identity for lesbians and gay men. It is an identity that has radically and
fundamentally transformed the face of legal subjectivity, displacing its
insistence on heteronormativity. But it is also an identity that reinforces
other dominant norms of legal subjectivity and reconstitutes lesbian and gay
men in its image.

